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ABSTRACT:
Since its inception in the early 1980s, the success of China's enterprise reforms
remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new element into the analysis of
state-owned enterprise performance by drawing on the recent increase in inter-
regional income disparities. It is argued that as a result of less favourable
structural conditions and stronger fiscal dependence on the central government,
reform implementation in the interior provinces has lagged behind the progress
made along the coast. This hypothesis is investigated using enterprise survey data
from three interior provinces which is compared to a similar survey carried out
earlier in four coastal cities. The evidence generally supports the view of larger
administrative restrictions in the interior and relatively poor economic
performance.
Martin Raiser,
Kiel Institute of World Economics
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The performance of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been hotly de-
bated ever since the inception of industrial reforms almost 15 years ago. Until the
late 1980s, a widely shared view held that the partial nature of China's enterprise
reforms had limited their effectiveness. Efficiency was declining and the soft
budget constraint was still largely in existence (see e.g. Tidrick, 1986; Wong,
1986). More recently, those finding were contested in a series of enquiries
starting with Chen et al. (1988) which revealed substantial efficiency
improvements in China's SOEs over the 1980s (Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng,
1992; Groves et al, 1994; for surveys of that literature see Wu, 1993; Raiser,
forthcoming). However, this optimistic assessment has not remained unchallenged
either, as China's SOEs have produced growing losses and arguably have become
a financial burden for the rest of the economy (Woo et al., 1994; Broadman,
1995; Bouin, 1996). The optimists counter that SOEs overstate losses in order to
evade taxation and that declining profits are a result of growing competition on
the domestic market and are not necessarily a general concern, albeit an urgent
fiscal problem (Sicular, 1994; Jefferson and Rawski, 1994).
As it stands, the debate is far from its resolution. One reason for this may be that
the discussion tends to generalise results obtained from enterprise survey data
which may or may not be representative for the whole industrial sector.
1 Specifi-
* The paper was written as part of a project on "Decentralisation and Enterprise Reforms in
China". Financial support from the Volkswagen-Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks are due to Peter Nunnenkamp for comments and Michaela Rank for high speed
research assistance.
The author also wishes to thank Professor Wang Hongling, Dr. Shan Lie and Mrs. Chen,
all from the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for their
help in collecting the data and numerous discussions on the state of Chinese enterprise
reforms.
1 Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992) estimate total factor productivity growth in SOEs
based on aggregate data, but their production elasticities are derived from a cross-section
of enterprises.cally, the regional and sectoral dimensions of SOEs performance are often left
unexplored. However, one of the salient features of the Chinese economy since
the mid-1980s is precisely the growing income gap between the Southeastern
coastal provinces and the rest of China (Jian, Sachs and Warner, 1996; Raiser,
1996). Part of this divergent performance might be attributed to variations in the
implementation of enterprise reforms at the local government level which effec-
tively Control around 80 per cent of all SOEs. Another reason, not incompatible
with the foregoing, is that growing competition in the 1990s has indeed exposed
SOE inefficiencies. The resulting losses would be expected to be larger in the
interior regions where reforms had progressed less during the 1980s.
This paper tries to fill parts of these gaps by offering new enterprise level evi-
dence from three interior provinces for the 1990-1994 period. The data come
from an enterprise questionnaire distributed to 372 state-owned, collective, town-
ship and private enterprises in Jilin, Shanxi and Sichuan provinces. The same
questionnaire was also employed in an earlier survey among enterprises located
in four of China's most dynamic coastal areas, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Xiamen and Shanghai (Raiser, forthcoming). This allows for some comparisons
of the qualitative data in particular to test for regional differences in the imple-
mentation of reforms.
2 As I will show, major differences in SOE autonomy exist
in the labour market, with a vast majority of the interior sample reporting
administrative interference in employment and to a lesser extent wage decisions,
whereas such interference is only reported by a minority of SOEs in the coastal
sample. The interior sample also shows a much greater sensitivity to competition,
product quality, information on suppliers and markets, and availability of skilled
workers as determinants of performance, arguably reflecting the greater structural
difficulties in the old industrial heartland of China. The greater autonomy of
township and private enterprises that has been established in previous studies is
2 A quantitative comparison is in principle possible by pooling data from the two surveys for
the years 1990-1992. This must be left open for future research.confirmed by the present sample. However, the extent of state interference even
in township enterprises suggests a differentiated view of this most dynamic sector
of the Chinese economy. Methodologically, the paper tries to improve on the
current discussion of total factor productivity (TFP) growth among China's SOEs
by allowing for non-neutral technical progress within the framework of a
Translog production function with three inputs. I find that technical progress in
SOEs is capital using and material saving. This raises some doubts as to the
sustainability of China's capital extensive growth path, bearing in mind the
country's comparative advantage. Finally, the paper confirms that there are
sectoral differences in the performance of China's industrial enterprises. Yet, the
sample survey evidence fails to reflect the generally better performance of light
industry. In the context of a sluggish regional economy, even sectors with
buoyant output growth at the national level perform rather poorly.
The paper begins with an overview over China's macroeconomic and industrial
performance during the first half of the 1990s (Section II). Some salient regional
differences are highlighted. Section HI introduces the enterprise sample. It then
proceeds to a qualitative comparison with the coastal sample mentioned above.
Section IV carries the empirical analysis of the nature of technical change in the
sample. Section V concludes on the results.
II. GROWTH, INFLATION AND GROWING DISPARITIES: CHINA'S
MACROECONOMY IN THE 1990S
The first half of the 1990s saw yet another macroeconomic cycle characterised
by first rapidly increasing growth rates followed by a bout of inflation and ending
in a period of macroeconomic restraint (Figure 1). These cycles have been typical
for China's macroeconomic development throughout the reform period. However,
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inflation without killing growth, as Gross Domestic Product in 1996 is expected
to increase by 9-10 per cent with inflation well down to single digit levels by
September this year.
If the first half of the 1990s was a period of rapid growth for China as a whole,
the sources of this impressive performance have been highly concentrated along
the coastline. Growth in the interior provinces has been far lower than the
national average. Particularly in the Northeastern industrial heartland and the
Western provinces bordering on Central Asia, structural legacies from the period
of central planning have hindered the development of a dynamic non-state sector
in light industry which is responsible for much of the growth
1 in the economy as a
whole. As Raiser (1996) shows, these structural legacies combined with a distor-
tionary system of inter-provincial fiscal transfers have prevented the convergence
of per capita incomes among interior provinces and thereby have accentuated the
existing income gap between the coast and the interior. Table 1 bears evidence tothis observation. It displays the growth of total industrial output and industrial
output in SOEs for 1990-1994, and the share of SOEs and heavy industry in
industrial output in 1994 for China as a whole and for the three interior provinces
in which the enterprise sample studied below is located.
3 The share of industrial
output emanating from SOEs and heavy industry is above the national average in
Table 1 — Industrial Output Growth 1990-1994, Share of State-Owned Enterprises
in 1994, Share of Heavy Industry in 1994, Total China, Three Interior






















































































Source: Naughton (1996: 1090); SSB (1991; 1995).
Of the three provinces, Jilin and Shanxi belong to the Northeastern region while Sichuan is
located in the Southwest. Jilin is a traditional industrial center since the pre-World War II
period, Shanxi is a major coal producing area, while Sichuan was one of the provinces
most involved in the militarisation and industrialisation of the West of China during the
1960s.all three provinces, with Northeastern Jilin standing out as the most "traditionally
socialist" of the three. Note that growth rates are given both at constant prices as
published by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB, 1991; 1995) and at current prices
deflated by the national industrial producer price index, also published by SSB
(various issues). Growth at constant prices is on average about 3 per cent per
annum above growth at current prices deflated with the official price index. This
statistical discrepancy highlights the critical role of choosing the right deflator in
gauging China's industrial growth performance (Rawski, 1991; Woo et al.,
1994). I will come back to it in detail below.
Other indicators confirm the regional differences in economic performance. For
instance, the ratio of the share of total SOE losses to the share of national indus-
trial output by province is above one in 15 provinces, of which 6 are located in
the Northeast and another 6 in the West or Southwest (Broadman, 1995). All
three provinces hosting the present enterprise sample belong to this group, the
ratios being 1.6, 1.9, and 1.2 in Shanxi, Jilin, and Sichuan respectively. As
mentioned above, structural legacies are partly responsible for this inferior per-
formance. The lower panel of Table 1 displays growth rates of industrial output
and the share of SOEs by sector. Thereby, the Chinese industrial classification
has been aggregated to ten sectors within manufacturing. These aggregates are
the same as will be used in the sectoral analysis of the survey data below.
4 The
aggregation hides some variation among smaller aggregates. Nevertheless, the
4 The sectoral aggregates were formed as a weighted sum of the following industrial
classifications:
Food = food processing, food manufacturing, beverage manufacturing
Paper = timber processing, furniture manufacturing, papermaking and paper products
Chemicals = raw chemical materials and chemical products, pharmaceuticals, chemical
fibres, rubber products, plastic products
Metallurgy = smelting and pressing of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, metal products
Machinery = ordinary machinery,, special purpose equipment, transport equipment
Electronics = electrical equipment and machinery, electronics and telecommunications
Textiles, garments, and building materials were not further aggregated.broad trend of lower growth in heavy industry and particularly in those sectors
where SOEs are dominant emerges very clearly from the Table.
In addition to structural differences, differences in the implementation of enter-
prise reforms might explain part of the variation in regional economic per-
formance. Because most SOE losses are still financed by the center through fiscal
transfers or central bank policy loans, regional governments may have few incen-
tives to press for efficiency improvements, particularly as the social costs of
restructuring such as unemployment would be borne mainly at the local level.
5
This interaction between structural conditions and reform implementation can be
tested with microeconomic data on the operating environment of SOEs located in
different provinces of China. Raiser (forthcoming) performs such a comparison
for the four cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Shanghai and finds a
much lesser degree of autonomy in Shanghai that corresponds to that city's higher
share of SOEs and closer fiscal interdependence with the central government. The
availability of qualitative survey data based on exactly the same questionnaire for
three interior provinces provides an ideal opportunity to further verify this
correspondence.
III. GOVERNMENT-ENTERPRISE RELATIONS IN THE INTERIOR
The data used in the remainder of this paper come from an enterprise survey of
SOEs, collectively-owned enterprises (COEs), township and village enterprises
(TVEs), private enterprises, and a few shareholding companies (in which the state
typically has majority ownership through various levels of government) carried
out by members of the Institute of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences in the year 1995. The questionnaire was returned by 372 enterprises
5 Qiang and Roland (1994) make the same argument in the context of fiscal decentralisation
which is said to harden the budget constraints of local governments. In the case of Chinese
interior provinces less decentralisation may imply a softer budget constraint and hence less
willingness to implement painful reforms (Raiser, forthcoming).distributed over 34 sectors of Chinese industry. Of these 365 enterprises will be
used in the analysis of the qualitative data by ownership in this section (seven
enterprises did not report their ownership). In the analysis by industrial sector
another 21 cases are lost because they did not belong to any of the 10 major sec-
toral aggregates.
Table 2 presents the distribution of enterprises by ownership, location, and indus-
trial sector. The sample is clearly dominated by SOEs, which make up 72.9 per
cent of all enterprises. COEs account for 16.2 per cent;TVEs for 7.1 per cent and
1.9 per cent are private and shareholding companies respectively. The distribution
across sectors reveals a concentration in chemicals and machinery which reflects
the more heavy industrial orientation of the interior provinces under study. The
ownership distribution is comparatively even across all sectors in contrast to the
specialisation of non-state enterprises in light industry observed at the national
level. However, as pointed out by Oi (1996), TVEs are far from a homogenous
group. Indeed, TVEs in the present sample are in many respects quite similar to
SOEs, cautioning against lumping them together with private ownership forms.
Finally, the distribution across provinces shows a below average representation of
TVEs in Jilin. This mirrors the earlier observation that Jilin is the most
"traditionally socialist" of all three provinces.
The qualitative questionnaire contains three major sets of questions. The first asks
about the management form of the enterprise and the structure of decision making
authority in various areas of enterprise management. The second set enquires
about the determinants of enterprise profitability and the reaction to competition.
The third set requires managers to subjectively judge the level of capacity utilisa-
tion arid optimal employment in their enterprise. The first two sets are analysed in
this section only with respect to ownership differences and to differences between
coastal and interior SOEs. The survey does reveal some sectoral differences, butTable 2 — Distribution of Enterprise Sample by Ownership, Location and Industrial






















































































Source: Enterprise survey data, interior sample.
they are overall too small to be worth reporting. Excess employment is analysed
in Section IV.
Table 3 reports the distribution of enterprises by management form in 1990 and
1994. Five management forms are distinguished, namely shareholding, contract
responsibility, leasing, director responsibility, and corporation.^ In 1990, most
Some clarification of these classifications is in order. Shareholding companies present the
latest stage in current enterprise reforms. They may be owned in part by private investors
(in which case they fall under the ownership category "shareholding") or by various levels
of government (which is why these groups also report shareholding as one possible
management form). It is not entirely clear why some shareholding enterprises report other
management forms. It is likely that the distinctions to SOEs or COEs are often fuzzy.
Corporatisation involves the delegation of full financial responsibility to the enterprise
level, including the possibility of bankruptcy. It is also a fairly recent phenomenon. For












































































































Source: Enterprise survey data, interior sample.
SOEs were under the contract responsibility system, whereas by 1994, the largest
proportion was under director responsibility. The same shift over time may be
observed among COEs and TVEs, although to a lesser extent. This result
contrasts with the coastal sample analysed in Raiser (forthcoming) where the
share of enterprises under director responsibility declined from over 80 per cent
in the mid 1980s to 57.3 per cent in 1992. It is not clear whether this shift had any
implications for the operating environment of the enterprises concerned, however.
Hay et al. (1994) fail to find significant differences in a sample of 700 SOEs for
the late 1980s. I have also broken down the information on autonomy by
management form in the present sample and find no significant differences
between the contract and the director responsibility system. The other
management forms pertain chiefly to TVEs, private enterprises and shareholding
companies. It is noteworthy that inspite of the 1993 regulations on the future11
reform of state enterprises, which envisages the corporatisation of large and
medium scale SOEs, the share of this management form has not increased in the
sample. The proportion of SOEs reporting "other" management forms has,
however, greatly increased, suggesting that some changes might have occurred in
the corporate governance structures of the enterprises concerned.
Table 4 turns more directly to enterprise autonomy and asks for the decision
making authority over a variety of areas. Six forms of authority are distinguished,
namely decision making by the firm, the supervisory authority* joint decision
making between the firm and the supervisory authority, decision making by the
director, by the executive board, and by the workers' council. Overall, 17 areas
of decision making were distinguished in the questionnaire, 7 of which concern
investment and production and are reported in Table 4. Table 5 deals with
employment and wage decisions.
7 With respect to investment, Table 4 reveals
that 64 per cent of all SOEs made investment decisions without administrative
interference (the sum of columns 1, 4 and 5). This is a remarkably high number,
considering the general perception that investment is still the most important
target for Chinese economic planning (Naughton, 1996). Moreover, this figure is
substantially above the result for the coastal sample, obtained two years earlier
which is reported in the lowest row of each panel (39 per cent of SOEs in the
coastal sample reported no administrative interference in investment). However,
the figures for the interior sample in Table 4 are put in some doubt by a compan-
ion question that asked for the maximum scale of investment that enterprises
could decide on their own. A vast majority of all surveyed enterprises reported
restrictions in this area. Another possible reason for the surprising degree of
7 The five areas that are not reported are: type of technology to employ, source of
equipment, source of raw materials, level of non-plan output, internal employee
assignment. In all these areas, decision making was typically located either with the firm or
the director. The differences to the coastal sample were marginal.12
Table 4 — Ownership and Autonomy in 1994: Investment and Production Decisions,











































































































































































































































































a Row totals do not sum to 100 per












































































































cent, as some unspecified residual category was also
Source: Enterprise survey data, interior and coastal samples.
investment autonomy in the present sample might be that the overall macro-
economic environment was relatively permissive at the time of the interview.
Even among non-SOEs, the proportion reporting administrative restrictions
among the interior sample is lower than among non-SOEs along the coast,
although the latter included a substantial number of joint ventures and foreign14
Table 5 — Ownership and Autonomy in 1994: Employment and Wage Decisions,





























































































































































































































































































a Row totals do not sum to 100 per cent, as some unspecified residual category was also
included as possible answer.
Source: Enterprise survey data, interior and coastal samples.
owned enterprises which would be expected to be more autonomous than COEs
and TVEs. The substantial autonomy of SOEs in the sources of investment funds
is easily explained by the dominant role of serf-financing in the investment
process. Again, autonomy is higher in the interior sample, probably for similar
reasons as in the case of investment.
With respect to production decisions, Table 4 suggests that the central plan has
virtually stopped to play a role in determining the level and price of output even
among SOEs. Less than 15 per cent of SOEs cannot freely decide to produce a
new product or abandon an old product. Slightly more SOEs are constrained in
the price they charge on the free market. Generally, autonomy in this area is
higher than in investment, mirroring a result from the coastal sample. The
supervisory authority does tend to interfere more in export decisions, where 23.5
per cent of enterprises report joint decision making or decision making by the
supervisory authority alone. As in the case of new investments, the autonomy of
COEs and TVEs is generally higher still than that of SOEs. Particularly note-
worthy is the large percentage of enterprises under shareholding ownership16
reporting restrictions in the price of market sales. As mentioned before, shared
holding companies typically remain in the...hands of some level of government.
They usually produce in very sensitive product areas such as the domestic com-
puter industry or in scientific research.
8 The introduction of new corporate gov-
ernance structures thus does not guarantee a real change in the operating
environment of the enterprise concerned (see also Broadman, 1995). Indeed, se-
lection for an experiment in a new form of enterprise-government relations
suggests that the enterprise chosen already is a an above average performer
benefiting from particular attention but correspondingly suffering from substantial
interference from the central and provincial governments.
The labour market offers the most interesting contrast both between ownership
groups in the present sample and of SOEs in the interior to SOEs in the coastal
sarnple. In the three interior provinces, 62 per cent of SOEs and still 48 per cent
CQEs reported joint decision making with supervisory authorities concerning the
total labour force, and in more than a quarter of all cases enterprises in these two
ownership categories could not influence their level of employment at all. By
contrast, only 15 per cent of TVEs and less than 30 per cent of shareholding
companies reported administrative interference in this area. In the coastal sample,
the percentage of SOEs experiencing restrictions was 31 per cent. This general
pattern is repeated in decisions about the sources of employees. Less than half of
SOEs and COEs in the interior sample are restricted in determining the wage
level for each type of worker (although administrative interference in SOEs is still
more frequent than along the coast) and none at all face administrative inter-
ference in determining bonuses. Worker councils have some influence both over
wages and bonuses, notably so in COEs. More importantly, worker councils are
8 One such company was presented to the author as a model for the success of the latest
SOp reforms in Jilin province. It had close links to Changchung university and the Chinese
Academy of Social Science and stood under the direct protection of the State Planning
Commission.17
dominant in decision making about dismissal in both SOEs and COEs. This
contrasts to other ownership forms in the present sample and to SOEs along the
coast. The influence of worker councils in this area is worrisome, as it is likely to
prevent employment restructuring in loss-making enterprises. The extent to which
this has caused overemployment in SOEs and COEs is briefly analysed below.
The overall impression that labour markets are the least reformed area in
enterprise decision making in the present sample is finally supported by the fact
that this is the only area where private enterprises face any restrictions at all.
The preceding discussion has uncovered important differences in the operating
environment of SOEs and other ownership forms, as well as SOEs in the coastal
provinces of China. To what extent this has affected the performance of SOEs in
the interior and the coast and of other ownership forms may be gauged from man-
agers' responses to the questions what were the major influences behind a change
in profitability and the failure to reach maximum capacity. Table 6 reports
answers to the first question (most important cause of change in profitability). 16
possible reasons were suggested. The first important result is that SOEs and
COEs do not seem to complain about a lack of autonomy as a determinant of
profitability. Rather, TVEs seem most affected by government interference. An
unambiguous interpretation of this result is difficult. It might suggest that a lack of
autonomy of SOEs is compensated for by government subsidies. The responses
of TVEs also demonstrate the scope for government interference even in this
sector which is usually classified as quasi-private by analysts of Chinese
industrial performance (e.g. Sachs and Woo, 1994). It is possible that locational
factors overweigh ownership differences in this respect, supporting the view of
more conservative reform policies in the interior. Less speculative is an
interpretation of differences between coastal and interior SOEs. Roughly a third
of interior SOEs (and COEs) quote product quality and access to information on
factor and product markets as important determinants of profitability while this18
Table 6— The First Most Important Determinant of Enterprise Profitability by
Ownership, per cent of Subsample
Demand factors
1) Change in level of
market demand




3) Autonomy in pro-
duction
4) Autonomy to set
prices "













11) Quality of products
12) Capacity
13) Level of technology
14) Availability of
skilled workers
15) Supply of raw ma-
terials
















































































































Source: Enterprise survey data, interior and coastal samples.
proportion is only 8 per cent in the coastal sample. For coastal SOEs, demand
factors are by far the most important determinants of profitability. Arguably, this
reflects differences in the efficiency of production and in the market orientation of19
the two samples, although part of the explanation may also be that the coastal
sample was interviewed in 1992 when memories of the 1990-1991 recession
were still fresh, while 1995 (the date of the interior sample survey) was a year of
relatively rapid growth.
9 The only ownership group in the interior sample that
displays a comparable sensitivity to demand factors as the coastal SOEs are
shareholding companies which, as mentioned before, are among the
technologically most advanced of Chinese enterprises.
The contrast between SOEs in the coastal and interior samples is brought out
most clearly by Table 7 which asks for the major reason that enterprises failed to
reach maximum capacity. Over a third of SOEs in the interior report competition
from better quality or cheaper products as the main reason for their failure to pro-
duce their potential output. The proportion of non-SOEs in the interior naming
competition as the major constraint on capacity utilisation is considerably lower.
The comparison to the coastal sample reveals that only 13 per cent of coastal
SOEs were affected by competition. Unfortunately, over 50 per cent of coastal
SOEs either gave three of more reasons at the same time or quoted other un-
specified reasons in answer to the question. But even when all responses which
include competition among various other causes of suboptimal capacity utilisation
are added to the cases in row two, the proportion of coastal SOEs affected by
competition rises to only 19 per cent.
1
0 In the other areas the differences are not
as accentuated. Noteworthy is the high percentage of TVEs affected by materials
and energy supply bottlenecks which shows their continuous discrimination in
product markets still largely controlled by state trading.
9 In answers to the question what were the main reactions to increased competition (not
reported here for reasons of space), managers of the coastal SOEs quoted improved
product quality far more often than interior SOEs. This underlines the interpretation that
structural difficulties interact with a more restrictive administrative environment in making
life more difficult for SOEs in the interior than along the coast.
*0 Competition is not the major factor among the cases included in row seven. The largest
proportion of coastal SOEs in this category quoted a combination of insufficient overall
demand and several supply bottlenecks.20














































































Source: Enterprise survey data, interior and coastal samples.
The above, evidence is suggestive of significant differences in the operating
environment of SOEs in the interior and coastal provinces of China. This regional
differentiation has so far not been exploited in quantitative studies of SOE
performance. My earlier research (Raiser, forthcoming) found that efficiency
improvements among SOEs in the coastal sample were moderately positive over
the 1980-1992 period (see also Perkins, 1996). The evidence in Table 6 and 7
above suggests that interior SOEs face more pronounced adjustment problems
and remain under tighter government control (at least with respect to the labour
market). They may thus be expected to perform below average. The following
section examines TFP growth in the present sample and demonstrates that indeed
the economic performance of interior SOEs has been disappointing.21
IV. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN A SAMPLE OF INTERIOR
ENTERPRISES
a) Descriptive Statistics
This section starts with some summary statistics by ownership and industrial
sector. Data for private and shareholding companies are not reported as the
sample sizes are too small for statistical inference. Table 8 reports information on
average employment, labour productivity, capital intensity, average wage, and
average total worker compensation. Enterprise size, as given by average em-
ployment, varies greatly across both ownership and industrial sectors. SOEs are
on average almost three times as large as COEs or TVEs. Among industrial sec-
tors, average employment is increasing with capital intensity. However, in the
case of ownership this correlation is reversed as TVEs are more capital intensive
than SOEs in the present sample. This is certainly not representative for China as
a whole, but it may-help to explain some unexpected results of the qualitative
questionnaire relating to the degree of administrative interference in TVEs; The
TVEs in this sample seem to belong to the group of established industrial
enterprises on the outskirts of major industrial towns rather than to the group of
rapidly expanding rural workshop type establishments.
1
1 In line with their higher
capital intensity; TVEs in the present sample do also have substantially higher
labour productivity. There is no correlation of capital intensity and labour pro-
ductivity at the sectoral level, however. Wages are more or less equal across all
subsamples, variations in worker compensation coming primarily from welfare
payments in kind, most importantly housing. Total worker compensation is con-
sequently higher in SOEs than in COEs or TVEs.
1
1 One TVE that I visited had actually become the major producer of radiators in Jilin
province with customers all across Northeastern China. It had recently bought its major
competitor, a financially weak COE located in an adjacent urban district. Relations to the
municipal government bodies were extensive, and considered helpful.Table8—
22
Sample Descriptives: Average Employment, Labour Productivity, Capital





































































































Source: Enterprise survey data, interior sample.
Table 9 turns to some quantitative evidence on enterprise profitability, excess
employment, and worker incentives. The average net rate of return (gross profits
minus all taxes paid over the net value of fixed assets) is around 7 per cent in
both SOEs and COEs but 13 per cent in TVEs. This does not point at serious
financial fragility in many SOEs, although it confirms the better performance of
TVEs in previous studies. The fact that not a single enterprise in the sample
reported negative net profits does, however, suggest some caution in the
interpretation of the financial data. An alternative way to look at enterprise
financial performance is to compute the net income tax rate, calculated as the dif-
ference between total taxes and sales taxes over net value added. 6.2 per cent of
SOEs in the sample reported a negative number, indicating serious financialTable 9 —
23
Sample Descriptives: Profitability, Taxation, Excess Employment and




















































































a Optimal employment was estimated by managers in the qualitative questionnaire.
Source: Enterprise survey data, interior sample.
difficulties. The average net income tax rate is below that in TVEs, although
COEs pay even less in average taxes. The variations in net income tax rates
across industrial sector do not match well with the data on profitability, again
urging for a cautionary interpretation of the financial data. Possibly the most
accurate indicator of financial stress may be the data on overemployment,
reported by managers in the qualitative questionnaire. As shown below, excess
labour is one determinant of variations in enterprise efficiency. SOEs report a
higher average level of overemployment (14 per cent) than TVEs (11 per cent),
but COEs have the highest average overemployment with 18 per cent of the
labour force considered redundant by managers. These results square well with
the qualitative results on administrative restrictions in the labour market reported
in Table 5, although one might have expected even larger differences. The highest24
overemployment across sectors is recorded in food (24 per cent) and textiles (21
per cent), the lowest in garments (10 per cent).
1
2 Table 9 finally shows that the
ratio of average bonuses plus overtime pay to the average wage does not vary
much across ownership or sector. In particular, it shows little relation to either
profitability or excess employment and is almost as high in TVEs as in SOEs.
Bonuses were originally devised as an incentive scheme to encourage increased
worker effort. They are usually paid out of retained profits and should therefore
display some sectoral variation. As such variation is minimal in the sample, it is
doubtful that bonuses still fulfil the role of a positive incentive. Instead they seem
to have become an expectedly permanent part of worker remunerations.
b) Output Growth and the Issue of Deflation
Table 10 turns to the growth of output in the sample. This is in principle the most
direct way to gauge economic performance but, because growth rates are strongly
affected by the use of deflators, their discussion warrants some closer attention.
Table 10 displays four columns giving measures of the average growth rate of
gross and net value of output at constant prices and at current prices deflated by
the official producer price index respectively, and two columns presenting data on
average capital and labour input growth. As already observed in Table 1, output
growth at constant prices is substantially above growth at current prices deflated
with the official price index in all subsamples. It is well known that Chinese
output data at constant prices may overstate true output growth by a significant
margin (Rawski, 1991; Woo et al., 1994). On the other hand, the official
producer price index displays a degree of sectoral variation that is at least
surprising for the first part of the 1990s, when the great majority of sales already
occurred at market prices. This point is brought out by Table 11 giving the
1
2 This squares well with this sector's high profitability. But neither correlation to the two
financial indicators is high across sectors.25
Table 10 — Average Output Growth Using Official and Enterprise Specific Deflators,
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Source: Enterprise survey data, interior sample; SSB (var. issues).
official price index and the average enterprise specific price index (obtained by
dividing gross output at current prices through gross output at constant prices) for
each of the 10 sectors in the present sample. While price increases are more or
less equal across sectors using enterprise specific prices, the span in cumulative
price increases over the 1990-1994 period amounts to almost 100 percentage
points difference using official prices (paper vs. metallurgy). The largest differ-
ence between the two series is in the metallurgical industry and in building mate-
rials where the inflation differences amount to an average 12.8 and 8.4 percentage
points per annum respectively. Returning to Table 10, the impact on output
growth rates is dramatic. Using survey data on output in constant prices, gross26











































































































































Source: SSB (var. issues); Enterprise survey, interior sample.
output increases by 4.7 per cent per annum in the metallurgical sector, while it
declines by dramatic 8.1 per cent when the official price index is used as the out-
put deflator.
Which deflator should be used? The comparison of value added growth with the
growth in capital and labour inputs given in Table 10 might provide a useful clue.
It should be noted that capital inputs are recalculated by summing net real27
investment over the 1990 figures for the net value of fixed assets, using official
province specific price indices for investment goods and depreciation. Both
capital and labour inputs increased in the present sample, capital by an average of
roughly 6 per cent per year and employment by an average of 1.2 per cent.
Neither metallurgy nor building materials show much below average rates of
increase in capital or labour inputs. Looking at the growth in the net value of
output, one can see that both sectors display slightly above average output growth
when enterprise specific prices are used, but dramatic declines when official
prices are used. The latter numbers would imply an average decline in TFP of the
order of 15 per. cent per annum and above which is unrealistic considering the
positive overall growth rate in the economy. Unless one would be willing to grant
that the present sample is highly unrepresentative for the rest of industry, even in
the interior, or that the official growth numbers are entirely wrong, such a diver-
gence of results from regional aggregates seems unacceptable. Hence, although I
recognise the potential upward bias in constant price data, I chose to use enter-
prise specific deflators for the analysis of technical change in what follows.
Before turning to this issue, it is worth emphasising that even by the constant
price measure output growth was all but insignificant in the present sample. Value
added hardly increased at all, and gross output rose by a mere 1 per cent in SOEs
and around 2.5 per cent in COEs and TVEs. These are not large growth rates
when the national average industrial output growth rate at official prices was 11
per cent. Note that in line with the descriptive statistics given above, growth
differences in terms of value added across ownership are not large. At the
sectoral level, textiles, garments and leather stand out as the worst performers,
while heavy industry records above average growth rates. The bad performance
of garments in particular contrasts to the national trend given in Table 1. It seems
that the interior location of the sample overweighed industry specific factors, a
result that could indicate the importance of local reform inplementation.28
c)'
1 The Nature of Technical Progress
I now turn to the analysis of technical progress in the sample.
1
3 For this purpose,
I estimate three factor input production functions, using both the Cobb-Douglas
and the more flexible Translog specification. The use of three inputs allows for a
richer specification of substitution possibilities in the Translog production
function and moreover enables me to analyse biases in the direction of technical
change. This comes at the cost of reintroducing the deflation issue, as materials
were only given at current prices and no enterprise specific materials price index
was available. I opt for the solution suggested by Woo et al. (1994), namely to
deflate materials with the enterprise specific output deflator. This assumes no
change in relative materials-output prices which may not be entirely unrealistic
for the 1990s. The justification given by Woo et al. (1994) is that if output at
constant prices contains an upward bias, the use of a downward-biased output
price deflator for materials might just mutually offset the resulting bias in TFP
growth rates. To what extent this also applies to my computations of non-neutral
technical progress is a matter that cannot be resolved for the present survey data.
The specifications to be estimated are, for the Cobb Douglas function:
where: A = technology constant,
Yit = real gross output value,
Kit = real net capital stock,
Lit = total employment,
1
3 This will be taken to include both exogenous technical change and efficiency improvements
over the sample period. While in principle, using panel data, the separate econometric
estimation of technical change and efficiency change is possible, in short panels such as
ours, the results are generally not consistent (Cornwell and Schmidt, 1996).29
> Mit = reaj value of raw material inputs,
VJY = white noise error term,
uit = firm specific efficiency level,
Pj = random disturbance of firm specific efficiency;
and for the Translog function:
2) , ..-,
lny = ln>4 + £cc; lnX; -+^—JJXPyfe MX . \nXk + X, +-\tt
2 + £X/lnXy • r + e
where: X-^ = are vectors of n inputs (n=3)
t = is time,
£ = Vj-r - (Mj - mt) as in equation 1)
and time and individual subscripts have been omitted for clarity of presentation.
In the latter case, the rate of technical progress (RTP) may be computed as the




Furthermore, the bias in technical progress for the jth input is given by:
4) x\t(j) = -h
+RTP
where: rft(j) = is the bias in technical change
jy is the cost share of the/th input.
Technical progress is input; using (saving) if:
5) TI,O)>0(<0).30
Because the data set is in panel format, the estimation of equations 1) and 2) is
carried out using the Generalised Least Squares estimator for a random effects
model. This allows for firm-specific deviations from the best practise production
function in addition to the usual error term. The assumption behind this estimator
is that the firm specific effects (which may also be interpreted as individual effi-
ciency estimates) are uncorrelated with the factor inputs. Inspite of the rigour of
this assumption, the random effects model is recommended for short panels such
as this one (Cornwell and Schmidt, 1996), Moreover, the random effects model
allows to include time invarying constant effects, such as subsample dummies in
addition to time varying determinants of enterprise efficiency.
Table 12 presents the results of the Cobb-Douglas specification by ownership and
industrial sector. An F-test for constant returns to scale is also given. The pro-
duction elasticities are all positive, the largest contribution to output coming from
material inputs. The contribution of capital is insignificant for textiles, materials
and metallurgy. Further investments in these three sectors are unlikely to produce
large output gains. The production elasticity of capital is also much higher in
TVEs and COEs than in SOEs, possibly indicating overinvestment in the latter
subsample. The production elasticity of labour is highly significant in all sub-
samples. It would be tempting to relate the estimated output elasticities to the
subsample average factor shares to gauge the extent of allocative inefficiency.
However, Kumbhakar (1996) has shown that the combination of efficiency wages
and labour market distortions can have offsetting effects on labour allocation
which could lead the researcher to wrong conclusions concerning
overemployment. For the purpose of the present paper allocative efficiency shall
not be further analysed and will be subsumed under the general trend in technical
change. This trend is unambiguously negatively in all subsamples except
electronics, although significantly so only for SOEs, food, textiles, leather,
garments and chemicals. The average rate of decline of 0.5 per cent per annum in31
Table 12 — Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates, Test for Constant Returns
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Source: Own calculations, interior sample.
SOEs is a little below Woo et al.'s result, who found a 1.4 per cent decline over
the; 1984r-1988 period in a sample of 300 medium to large scale SOEs using
exactly the same procedure as the present study. TVEs do not achieve any TFP
growth in contrast to all previous studies cited above, pointing again to the32
dominance of locational factors in enterprise performance. Finally, constant
returns to scale are rejected for SOEs, garments, machinery and electronics.
For the case of garments, this is not very plausible. Increasing returns in the SOE
sector gives some support to previous claims that the majority of troublesome
SOEs are relatively small and thus suffer particularly from non-SOE competition
(Naughton, 1993; Sicular, 1994). Increasing returns in machinery and electronics
are compatible with capital intensive production technology and substantial fixed
costs.
Table 13 turns to the Translog estimates. Only the terms relevant for the compu-
tation of technical change are given to save on space. An F-test tests the Translog
function against the Cobb-Douglas function by setting all higher-order terms
equal to zero. The Cobb-Douglas specification is retained for COEs, textiles, and
metallurgy. The parameter estimates in Table 13 are used to compute the average
RTP for each year and each of the remaining subsamples in Table 14. The general
picture of declining TFP growth is confirmed by these results. However, the
positive coefficient on the squared time variable causes the RTP to increase over
time. This could to some extent reflect variations over the business cycle during
the sample period which are hidden by the estimates in Table 12. Another
interesting contrast to Table 12 is that the RTP is lowest for the electronics
industry which was the only industry recording positive technical change in the
Cobb-Douglas case. The poor performance of the food sector is further
underlined while chemicals perform relatively better. These shifts in relative
positions are a reminder of the importance of using appropriate functional forms
before drawing far-reaching conclusions.
Looking at the coefficient estimates in Table 13, the biases in technical change
across subsamples may be gauged. Because all factor shares are positive and
because the RTP is negative in all years, technical progress is factor saving33
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Source: Own calculations, interior sample.
whenever the interactive time-input coefficients in Table 13 are negative (kk, Xm
and XX). Factor using technological progress results for small absolute values of
RTP ahd a positive interactive coefficient. I restrict the interpretation to those co-
efficients that are significant at the 10 per cent level. Technical change in SOEs is
capital using (at least for the later years) and material saving. This reflects well34
the development of factor markets in China. Although the government continues
to control the allocation of materials through state trading companies, the sales
occur largely at market prices. By contrast, prices for capital are far below market
clearing. Over the 1990-1994 period, real bank lending rates were highly negative
as inflation soared. From this perspective, the biases in technical change in the
SOE sample may have been the result of rational calculation by enterprise man-
agers. However, considering the scarcity of capital in most non-state sectors of
the economy and for much needed improvements in public infrastructure, the
capital using nature of technical change seems unsustainable in the future. Among
the other ownership groups, no statistically significant bias may be detected. The
capital using nature of technical change observed in SOEs is repeated in the food
and building materials sectors, and materials saving technical change occurs in
chemicals, building materials, and electronics. The garments sector stands out as
the only sector displaying capital saving technical change which is echoed by an
above average output elasticity of capital in Table 12. Finally, the chemicals
industry is the only industry showing a positive bias in technical change towards
employment which most closely reflects actual factor proportions at the national
level.




























































Source: Table 13, own calculations, interior sample.35
The last step in the analysis is to exploit the panel structure of the data in order to
identify possible determinants of firm specific efficiency levels. Rather than ex-
tracting the firm specific efficiency levels from the residuals of the production
function estimates, I introduce potential determinants of enterprise efficiency di-
rectly into the production function and test for their significance (for the same
approach in the context of Chinese enterprise data, see Groves et al., 1994). In
order to obtain reasonably large subsamples, I tested for pooling across industrial
sectors based on the Translog specification and obtained four aggregates:
1
4
- chemicals, machinery, and electronics
- metallurgy, building materials, and textiles
- food and paper products
- garments and leather.
I tried a large number of variables, a complete list of which is given in the foot-
note to Table 15. Of the incentive variables tried, only the ratio of bonus and
overtime payments to the sum of wages (conventionally interpreted as measuring
incentives for increased worker effort) showed any significant correlation with
firm specific efficiency levels. The effect is positive for the first two aggregates
representing heavy industry, but it is insignificant and even negative in the other
two aggregates. Moreover, testing for causality rather than correlation by
instrumenting the bonus-wage ratio with its one year lag (see Chetty, Ratha, and
Singh, 1994) led to the disappearance of any positive correlation in the first two
1
4 F-tests rejected the Cobb-Douglas function for all four aggregates. The F-statistics for
pooling across sectors were 1.48,-7.15, -1.01, and -0.44 for the four aggregates
respectively, accepting the pooled model at 1 per cent significance in all cases.Table 15
36
Determinants of Enterprise Efficiency in Ownership: Overemployment,





















































































a Standard errors in parentheses, * = 10, ** = 5, *** = 1 per cent in significance.
The full list of variables tried as determinants of enterprise efficiency was: the share of retained
profit in total profits, the share of output sold under the plan, the net income tax rate (Table 9),
the share of bank credit in the total source of investment, the management form (Table 3), a
capital vintage variable and the degree of capital utilisation as quoted by enterprise managers.
The insignificance of all these variables is partly due to very small sample sizes because of
missing data. See text for more discussion.
Source: Own calculations, interior sample.
aggregates as well.
1
5 The other variables in Table 15 capture ownership and
locational differences on the one hand and effective labour inputs on the other.
The ratio of optimal employment to actual employment (see Table 9) has a
15 The lack of significance of all other incentive variables given below Table 15 is
unsatisfactory. Testing alternative specifications such as interactive effects to measure
reform complementarity as in Hong and McMillan (1994) goes beyond the scope of the
present paper. One promising avenue for future research would be to pool the interior and
coastal samples and test for the complementarity of location and specific incentive
variables. It is expected that such complementarity should exist for the coastal sample.37
positive impact on efficiency, although with little significance except for the first
aggregate. This is at least suggestive of an overemployment problem, which
would square well with the results of Section III. The same holds true for the
share of productive workers in the total labour force. As Chinese managers have
tended to shift redundant workers to the service branches of their enterprises the
sign of the coefficient is expected although its low significance level precludes
firm conclusions. Ownership differences in efficiency levels are insignificant
which confirms to the impression gained all along this study that TVEs in the
present sample are not very different from SOEs or COEs. However, the loca-
tional dummies show a significantly lower level of enterprise efficiency in Jilin
province for the light industry aggregates. This result could be related to this
province's inherited heavy industrial structure with little competitive pressures
from a dynamic non-state sector which has been characteristic for the growth of
light industry in other provinces.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has followed one major aim. Enterprise level survey evidence from
three interior provinces was analysed in order to test whether locational differ-
ences in economic performance that are apparent in provincial growth rates are
confirmed at the microeconomic level. The results generally support this
hypothesis. A direct comparison of the operating environment of SOEs in the
interior provinces with results from an earlier survey of SOEs located along the
coast revealed a significantly higher degree of administrative restrictions in the
labour market in the interior sample although such differences were not present in
other areas of decision making. The structural legacy of heavy industrial
development under socialism was reflected by the large share of SOEs negatively
affected by competition in their financial performance in the interior, whereas this
was much less the case along the coast. Indeed, locational differences seemed to
outweigh ownership differences in the determinants of enterprises' financial38
performance, pointing at a combination of structural factors and more hesitant
reform implementation by local governments in the interior as potentially major
causes of divergent provincial growth performances.
The quantitative analysis of the present enterprise sample failed to find any
significant efficiency improvements over the 1990-1994 period. Not only was the
average rate of TFP growth negative for both SOEs and non-SOEs, but the
former also displayed capital using and material saving technological change, in
contradiction to factor scarcities at the national level. A likely culprit for this
arguably unsustainable pattern of technical change is the unreformed nature of
capital markets, granting SOEs access to loans at negative real interest rates
while denying the rest of the economy much needed funds. The poor performance
of TVEs in the present sample might be taken as further evidence that at least in
regions where SOEs are dominant such problems will not simply wither away
through the growth of the non-state sector. Reforms in the financial sector are
urgently needed, both to improve capital allocation across enterprises and the
efficiency of capital use within the SOE sector.
The significance of these findings for the ongoing debate over the success of
Chinese enterprise reforms is that regional disparities in enterprise performance
have to receive more attention than so far. Particularly as the 1990s have seen a
growing income gap between the Southeastern coast and the interior provinces,
more comparative analyses along the lines of this paper are needed to identify the
exact interrelationship between structural conditions, reform mindedness by local
governments and the resulting effectiveness of enterprise reforms. My hypothesis
would be that there is a strong complementarity between a competitive market
structure and the effectiveness of partial reform measures such as preferred by
China's leaders so far. In the structural weaker interior provinces introducing
selective performance incentives may not be sufficient to repeat the coastal
success.39
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